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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Statement 
1.1. Introduction  
As life has many uncertainties, people seek means of mitigating their risks. A form of risk mitigation is 
the transferring of the risk to an insurer, under an insurance policy. The creation of the obligation on 
the insurer, namely the obligation to pay “…an ascertained or ascertainable sum of money (or its 
equivalent) on the occurrence of a particular (uncertain) event…”1, provides comfort to the 
policyholder. 
However, the protection provided under an insurance contract is not always full-proof, which many 
policyholders come to realise once the particular event has materialised. Misunderstandings and 
miscommunications between the various parties can result in claims being rejected and policies being 
avoided, resulting in the policyholder being in a worse off position. Insurance is referred to as a 
“credence” good or service, which value is only established after a period of time and at some cost.2 
The insurance industry remains an important part of ensuring the financial wellbeing of the 
population. According to the report on the results of the long-term3 and short-term4 insurance 
industry published by the Reserve Bank as at end of June 2018 gross premiums of R248 billion and R68 
billion were received by primary insurers respectively. During the same period primary short-term 
insurers incurred R22 billion in claims, with primary long-term insurers incurring claims of 83% of net 
premiums.  
In 2014 the Financial Services Board (FSB) published a paper5 which set out the results of the Retail 
Distribution Review (RDR) conducted. The review was triggered as significant concerns were had by 
the Regulator regarding client disclosures, conflicts of interest, poor customer outcomes and mis-
selling.6 While the FSB acknowledged the protection provided by the FAIS Act, the paper highlighted 
inherent risks which existed in the regulatory framework and required mitigation.  
                                                          
1 Reinecke, van Niekerk and Nienaber South African Insurance Law (2013) 4 (n 13). 
2 Millard D and Kuschke B “Transparency, Trust and Security: An evaluation of the insurer’s precontractual 
duties” 2014 PER 2418. 
3 South African Reserve Bank Prudential Authority “The quarterly report on the results of the Long-term 
Insurance Industry for the period ended 30 June 2018” 2018 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/8834/Long-
Term%20Special%20Report%2030%20June%202018.pdf (23-10-2019).  
4 South African Reserve Bank Prudential Authority “The quarterly report on the results of the Short-term 
Insurance Industry for the period ended 30 June 2018” 2018 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/8835/Short-
Term%20Special%20Report%20June%202018.pdf (23-10-2019). 
5 Financial Services Board “Retail Distribution Review” 2014 https://www.masthead.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/FSB-Retail-Distribution-Review-2014.pdf (23-10-2019). 
6 See par 2 for the reasons the review was undertaken. 
  
The lens of the review and the focus of the Regulator at the time of the review was twofold. With 
reference to the impact of the global financial crisis and given the magnitude of the insurance industry 
as mentioned above, the industry required close governance to ensure that the industry was 
compliant with certain prudential requirements. Secondly, there was a growing concern regarding the 
fair treatment of customers and the proposals of the review sought to “…support the consistent 
delivery of fair outcomes…”.7  
1.2. Problem Statement 
While the objective of the FSB appeared noble in the 2014 RDR paper, it set itself a mammoth task of 
reforming the distribution landscape within South Africa. The impact of the proposals was anticipated 
to impact product suppliers, intermediaries and clients alike. This was to be achieved through various 
regulatory tools and through a phased approach.  
The time which has elapsed since the publication of the initial report has left industry unsure of which 
of the original proposals have been achieved and what is to be expected. To complicate matters 
further, the original creator of the review, namely the FSB, has since under Twin Peaks been 
restructured and is under new leadership.  
While the FSB referenced the “…key risks inherent in the current distribution landscape…”8, no 
empirical research was published to substantiate these key risks.  
1.3. Research Question 
The purpose of this appraisal is to review the regulatory progress made since the RDR report was 
published in 2014 and take cognisance of what has been achieved by Regulators to date to address 
the risks originally identified and what remains outstanding.  
1.4. Research Methodology  
The literary review will conduct an appraisal on the implementation of the recommendations 
positioned by the FSB in the 2014 RDR paper, reflecting on the amendment of enacted legislation and 
the introduction of new regulations as well as the annual communication published by the Regulator.  
1.5. Proposed Chapter Outline 
Chapter two provides the background leading to the RDR being conducted and subsequent publication 
of the RDR paper. Chapter three sets out the current regulatory landscape inclusive of new legislation 
                                                          
7 (n 5) 8.  
8 (n 5) 1. 
  
and amended legislation. Chapter four provides a high-level comparison with the other countries who 
have implemented similar regulatory frameworks. Chapter 5 provides a view on the evolution of the 
RDR recommendations and concludes on the implementation of the various phases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2: Background leading to RDR 
2.1. Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act9  
The primary objective of the FAIS Act is to regulate market conduct within the financial services 
industry.10 The aim of the FAIS Act is focused on the regulation of certain financial advisory and 
intermediary services11 provided to policyholders. Under the FAIS Act, Codes of Conducts are 
published to provide minimum standards to which the Financial Service Providers (FSP) would need 
to comply with to ensure customers are treated fairly. 
On a comparison of the FAIS Act with the principles of Treating Clients Fairly (TCF), it can be argued 
that the legislation sufficiently entrenches market conduct. The FAIS Act has a greater impact on the 
policyholder during the initial pre-contractual stages of the product cycle. As the product cycle 
progresses, focus is shifted to the insurer. However, the ultimate responsibility in ensuring that the 
policyholder is treated in a fair manner throughout the product cycle remains with the insurers.   
The FSB submitted that the FAIS Act lay a “…strong and comprehensive regulatory framework…” and 
that it “…raised the standards of professionalism and the management of conflicts of interests…”.12 
Despite the progress achieved through the FAIS Act in implementing market conduct, significant 
concerns remained, including those of “…poor customer outcomes and mis-selling…”13 
2.2. Statement of Intent 
In December 2005, the Minister of Finance and the Long-Term Insurance Industry (represented by the 
Life Offices’ Association of South Africa) signed a Statement of Intent, agreeing measures to be 
implemented with regards to retirement annuity funds and other savings products.14 Certain issues 
had been highlighted by the Pension Funds Adjudicator with regards to the lack of transparency 
around the various costs negatively impacting client expectations.  
Minimum standards were proposed to the credit policies which had been impacted by premium 
cessation. Furthermore, the Minister of Finance undertook to amend the regulations relating to 
commission on policies under the Long-Term Insurance Act (LTIA)15.  
                                                          
9 37 of 2002. 
10 (n 1) 511 (par 24.12). 
11 (n 9) pre-amble. 
12 (n 5) 10. 
13 (n 5) 1. 
14 The Long-term Insurance Industry and the Minister of Finance “Statement of Intent” 2005 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2005/Statementintent.pdf (23-10-2019). 
15 52 of 1998.  
  
The first phase of the commitments made under the Statement of Intent was given effect through 
amended regulations under the LTIA implemented on 1 December 2006.  
While the concept of market conduct was not cited in the statement, the underlying principles were 
included with references to the interests of policyholders, fairness and the impact of products on the 
financial stability of policyholders. Additionally, common themes such as transparency relating to the 
terms of policies and remuneration caps were carried through to RDR.  
2.3. Discussion paper on contractual savings 
In March 2006 National Treasury published a paper on contractual savings in the life insurance 
industry.16 Post the signing of the Statement of Intent, the insurance and intermediary industry 
underwent a consultative process with National Treasury resulting in the proposition of far reaching 
proposals “…designed to improve the cost and fairness of contractual savings products…”.17 
Key recommendations were proposed in light of the challenges identified, which recommendations 
included, among other items, disclosure requirements, financial literacy, quality of advice and 
regulation of remuneration.   
Post the release of the discussion paper, a timetable was provided which divided the project into three 
workstreams.18 The first work stream that was proposed was to resolve the issues relating to 
commission scales and early termination values. The second work stream would focus on consumer 
education, disclosure requirements, intermediary relationships, product simplification and 
commission issues. The third workstream would focus on the balance of the issues raised in the 
discussion paper.  
It was noted in RDR that the review built on a number of the issues raised in this discussion paper.19 
2.4. Twin Peaks 
Due to the impact the financial sector has on the economy and in light of the global financial crisis, 
National Treasury published a paper early 2011 entitled “A safer financial sector to serve South Africa 
                                                          
16 National Treasury “Contractual savings in the life insurance industry” 2006 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/Contractual%20savings%20in%20the%20life%20insurance%20
industry.pdf (23-10-2019). 
17 National Treasury “Treasury on discussion paper on contractual savings in life insurance industry” 2006 
https://www.gov.za/treasury-discussion-paper-contractual-savings-life-insurance-industry (23-10-2019). 
18 National Treasury “Contractual savings in the life insurance industry. Regulatory reforms: commission scales 
and minimum early termination values” 2008 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/Insurance%20commissions%20reform%20paper%202008.pdf 
(23-10-2019). 
19 (n 5) 10.  
  
better”.20 The Minister of Finance references the importance of regulating the international financial 
sector. The financial sector in South Africa held R6 trillion in assets in June 2010, which contributed 
10.5% annually of the gross domestic product.21 In particular, long-term insurers and short-term 
insurers held assets of R1.4 trillion and R90 billion respectively. 
Financial and economic stability remained vital, with South Africa committing to the prevention of 
similar crises. Certain commitments were made by President Zuma at the G-20 summit. A new 
framework for South Africa was proposed, which covered four policy objectives, namely financial 
stability, consumer protection and market conduct, expanding access through financial inclusion and 
combating financial crime.22 In order to achieve the objectives, a shift to a twin peaks model would be 
required.  
The Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee published a paper which detailed the proposed 
implementation of the twin peaks model, which would require the separation of prudential and 
market conduct supervision.23 The focus of the prudential regulator (who would form part of the South 
African Reserve Bank) would be “…to maintain and enhance the safety and soundness of regulated 
financial institutions.” through prudential regulation and supervision.24 In contrast, the focus of the 
market conduct regulator (to be the FSB) would be customer protection and “…to promote confidence 
in the South African financial system.”25 
The draft Financial Sector Regulation (FSR) Bill, which would provide the regulatory framework for 
twin peaks, was published in December 2013 for public comment. Post stakeholder engagement a 
final version was submitted to Parliament and the FSR Act26 was promulgated on 21 August 2017, with 
effect from 1 April 2018.  
2.5. Treating Clients Fairly (TCF) 
In light of the vulnerable position of consumers, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) (the 
Financial Services Board at the time of publication) developed a roadmap through which it wished to 
                                                          
20 National Treasury “A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better” 2011 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20-
%20Item%202%20A%20safer%20financial%20sector%20to%20serve%20South%20Africa%20better.pdf (23-10-
2019).  
21 (n 20) 3. 
22 (n 20) 4.  
23 Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee “Implementing a twin peaks model of financial regulation 
in South Africa” 2013 http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20-%20Item%203%20Roadmap.pdf 
(23-10-2019) 
24 (n 23) 6.  
25 (n 23) 6.  
26 9 of 2017.  
  
implement “…a programme for regulating market conduct of financial services firms…” which 
programme was entitled TCF.27 TCF “…seeks to ensure that fair treatment of customers is embedded 
within the culture of financial firms.”.28 Six fairness outcomes had been identified to be delivered 
throughout the stages of the product life cycle, namely product and service design, promotion and 
marketing, advice, point of sale, information after point of sale and the handling of complaints and 
claims. 
The FSB suggested that TCF outcome four, which addresses the suitability of advice, is the most 
relevant outcome to RDR.29 While advice is provided by a financial advisor and thus is regulated by 
FAIS, the FSB identify two responsibilities during the provision of advice, namely a responsibility on 
the adviser as well as a responsibility on the insurer in ensuring adequate advice is provided. They 
therefore identified the need to extend the focus of market conduct regulation to the product houses.  
2.6. Request for contributions on intermediary services and remuneration 
In 2011 the then Deputy Executive Officer of the FSB presented a presentation to industry on 
intermediary services and related remuneration.30 The purpose of the discussion, as well as the letter 
issued to industry associations, was to obtain industry input into refining the definition of intermediary 
services as well as input into the remuneration structure for various insurance products.  
Through the refinement of the services and the remuneration, the FSB sought to “…promote 
appropriate, affordable and fair advice and services…” and to “…support a sustainable business model 
for financial advice.”.31 Striking the balance between providing affordable advice and services while 
ensuring that the advisor is able to earn sufficient remuneration to create a sustainable business is 
tricky.  
The FSB advised that industry was “…overwhelmingly in favour of the FSB’s stated objective…”32 in 
attempting to reach a balance between the interests of the clients and those of the industry. However, 
there were differing views on how best to achieve this balance. 
 
                                                          
27 Financial Services Board “Treating customers fairly: The roadmap” 2011 
https://www.fscaconsumered.co.za/Consumer/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly/TCFRoadmapFinal231Mar20
11.pdf (23-10-2019).  
28 (n 27) 1.  
29 (n 5) 11.  
30 Financial Services Board “Intermediary services and related remuneration” 2011. 
https://www.fsca.co.za/Regulatory%20Frameworks/Archived%20Documents/2011%20-
%20Intermediary%20Services%20and%20Related%20Remuneration.pdf (23-10-2019). 
31 (n 30) 3. 
32 (n 5) 11. 
  
2.7. International developments 
The concerns raised by the various regulators were not unique to South Africa, and similar issues could 
be seen in other jurisdictions such as Australia, United Kingdom, Singapore and the European Union.33 
International law has always had an influence on South African law, and the approaches adopted by 
these countries were studied to identify any learnings which could be applied to our environment. A 
comparison to other jurisdictions will be unpacked in chapter 4. 
2.8.  Retail Distribution Review report  
RDR resulted in the recommendation of 55 specific proposals to be implemented through extensive 
amendments to the regulatory framework and in a phased approach. While certain changes could be 
achieved through amendments to the current regulations, certain changes would require new 
legislation to be enacted.  
The scope of the review was limited to retail customers, however activities of financial market 
infrastructures, investment managers or occupational pension funds were under regulatory review. 
However, the distribution of investment products, including collective investment schemes, and 
retirement savings products as well as insurance risk products were included.  
A specific focus of the review was related to the advice provided to customers. The FSB submitted that 
the regulatory framework at the time entrenched “…inherent conflict of interests…” which limited the 
customer’s ability to assess the value of the provided advice.34 The conflict of interest stemmed from 
the remuneration structure of those providing the advice. By the nature of receiving remuneration 
dependent on the sale of a financial product, the advisor is motivated to make the sale. This sale may 
however not be in the best interest of the potential policyholder.   
2.8.1. RDR Proposals 
The explanation of the proposals was categorised into three areas. 
Firstly, an activity-based approach was proposed to define the services provided by intermediaries to 
both customers and product suppliers. Financial advice, intermediary services and other services 
would be clearly and consistently defined to ensure that the parties were aware of what services were 
being provided on which party’s behalf.  
                                                          
33 (n 5) 12. 
34 (n 5) 9. 
  
The services provided by intermediaries to customers constituted mainly advice. In this instance, the 
intermediary is acting on the customer’s behalf as an agent and therefore owes a duty to the customer 
to provide advice in their best interest.  
The FSB submitted that “advice” had three sub-components, namely financial planning (risk planning 
which would structure a customer’s financial resources to meet their needs), up-front product advice 
(proposal of a suitable product to meet the needs of the consumer) and ongoing product advice 
(recommending a change in a product or structure to ensure that the product was still appropriate in 
meeting the customer’s needs). Part of the proposals recommended was the introduction of the 
concept of low advice. Low advice would be provided in instances where it would not be feasible to 
conduct a full needs analysis. This would need to be determined based on the level of advice 
appropriate to the product offered and its inherent riskiness or complexity.  
The services connecting product suppliers and customers related to direct distribution by the product 
supplier, alternatively where the distribution was intermediated by the intermediary. These services 
included sales execution (the selling of the product), which included the ongoing product maintenance 
or servicing, investment platform administration (administration of investments), product aggregation 
and comparison services, as well as referrals and lead generation.    
The services provided to product suppliers were defined as those services conducted on behalf of the 
product supplier. These were considered to be outsourcing functions as the product supplier would 
outsource a function that they would need to perform. There would be no intermediation between a 
product supplier and customer.  
Secondly, the relationships between product suppliers and intermediaries were considered. Criteria 
to determine the type of relationship was proposed, along with standard terminology to describe the 
relationships and disclosure requirements. This would assist the customer in determining what 
services were being provided and in which capacity the intermediary was acting, thus highlighting any 
possible conflicts of interest. The resultant effect was that intermediaries would be defined as one of 
the following, namely Independent Financial Adviser, multi-tied advisor or tied advisor. Variations of 
these roles were also suggested in the case where the intermediary is licenced in its own right, 
alternatively where they act in the capacity of a representative of a financial institution.   
In certain instances, financial advisers provide outsourced functions to a product supplier (as 
mentioned above) in addition to providing advice to customers which leads to a conflict of interest. 
Certain restrictions were proposed which would limit the type of services a financial advisor could 
perform and the remuneration that could be received.  
  
Despite the ability by the product supplier to enter into arrangements with intermediaries, the 
ultimate responsibility towards the customer remained with the product supplier. While FAIS set out 
the obligations of the intermediaries, the FSB argued that the product supplier was under less onerous 
obligations.35 To resolve this imbalance, various proposals were recommended which defined the 
responsibility of the product supplier towards the various advisors.  
In addition to the conflict of interests posed by the relationship between product suppliers and 
intermediaries, ownership structures and similar other relationships potentially posed a similar risk. 
The FSB undertook to engage with the industry to determine whether any controls were required.  
Lastly, based on the revised services and relationships achieved through the aforementioned 
proposals, the intermediary remuneration structure required review. As foundation certain general 
criteria would need to be considered when determining whether remuneration should be paid and 
the type thereof. In particular, specific remuneration standards were proposed for various services.  
Should financial planning or non-life insurance risk planning services be provided to the customer, 
advisors would be entitled to earn a planning fee which would need to be agreed directly with the 
customer. The customer would need to be made aware of exactly what services they would receive in 
exchange for the fee. Alternatively, should the advisor provide up-front or ongoing product advice, 
they would in turn be entitled to receive an advice fee as negotiated between the parties. Prescribed 
maximum limits for the planning and advice fee would not be prescribed, however benchmark 
guidelines would be published to guide advisors.  
In instances where intermediaries provided services to connect the product suppliers and customers, 
a fee for sales execution and ongoing product maintenance and servicing could be charged and would 
be payable by the product supplier in the form of either sales commission or service fee. The Regulator 
distinguished the difference in selling a product from providing advice to a customer.36 As an 
intermediary was able to provide both services, he would be entitled to commission as well as the 
advice fee. This defeated the object of imposing a commission cap as the intermediary would be paid 
twice for performing the same function. In response specific remuneration proposals were 
recommended. Product suppliers would be prohibited from remunerating intermediaries for the sale 
and servicing of investment products where advice was provided. Instead intermediaries would need 
to be paid an advice fee by the customer. With regard to life risk policies, insurers would be required 
to pay half of the remuneration to the intermediary up-front, with the balance to be paid as-and-when 
                                                          
35 (n 5) 44. 
36 (n 5) 51.  
  
to provide for ongoing servicing. Commission paid by product suppliers would be prohibited on 
replacement life risk policies and intermediaries would only be able to earn an advice fee.  
The concept of the equivalence of reward was introduced in light of industry practice whereby tied 
advisors were rewarded in excess of the commission that would have been payable to an external 
intermediary. Input from the industry was requested on which benefits would be considered when 
determining the remuneration which could be paid advisors.  
In an attempt to promote financial inclusion, attention was paid to what was referred to as the “low-
income sector”.37 It was acknowledged that the sale of investment and life risk products in this sector 
would require a difference in treatment and remuneration. Therefore, an exemption was proposed to 
allow for commission to be paid by product suppliers in addition to the advice fee earned by the 
intermediary from the customer. Consideration would be given to the sale of short-insurance products 
as well.  
In the short-term insurance environment, ongoing commission was justified given the nature of the 
products sold and the relevant policy servicing and maintenance required. A concern regarding the 
section 8(5)38 fee was raised, which fee brokers had charged in addition to the commission earned. It 
was proposed that the fee be replaced by an advice fee which was justified by the risk planning to be 
conducted and would need to be explicitly agreed with the customer.39 While the current commission 
structure for short term products created less of a risk for policy churn, cancellation conditions would 
be imposed to ensure that the client is aware of the replacement policy and the reason underlying the 
change.  
Product suppliers however are not required to use intermediaries to distribute their products and 
there is a direct market where products are sold directly by the product supplier to the customer. As 
no advice is provided and it is considered non-advice sales execution, no advice fees can be charged.  
Other types of services were being performed in exchange for remuneration, which remuneration 
structures would be reviewed. Referrals and leads would be provided to product suppliers or 
intermediaries with the view of a product being sold. Investment platform administration services 
would be provided in exchange for platform fees and rebates. 
In furthering the general principle that outsourcing fees must be reasonable and commensurate to 
the services provided, additional reforms were proposed. Binder fees payable to intermediaries would 
                                                          
37 (n 5) 56.  
38 Short-term Insurance Act of 53 of 1998.  
39 (n 5) 57.  
  
be capped at a specific percentage per binder activity performed. An outsourcing fee for the issuance 
of policy documents by an intermediary (who is not a binder holder) would be permitted but limited. 
The maximum commission cap for credit life insurance would be reduced to remove the 15% 
administration fee which was allowed in terms of the regulations.  
Finally, any forms of other remuneration payable by a product supplier to an intermediary, unless 
provided for in the regulations, would be prohibited.  
The phased approach was proposed in order to remedy the inappropriate practices contributing to 
the risk of conflicted advice. The proposals to be implemented would be determined based on 
priority.40 Fourteen proposals were identified to be implemented during phase 1, which was set to 
occur during the first half of 2015.41 A target date for implementation of the structural changes to 
intermediary remuneration and relationships was set for before mid-2016.42  
While the intention of the Regulator was clearly articulated in the paper, the method in achieving 
these outcomes was less defined. The risks in the opinion of the Regulator in the current landscape 
were highlighted and included risks to fair customer outcomes, risks to intermediary sustainability and 
risks to supervisory effectiveness.43 However, no analysis was conducted on the potential risks which 
may result from the implementation of the proposals.  
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Chapter 3: Current regulatory landscape  
3.1. New legislation  
3.1.1. Financial Sector Regulation (FSR) Act  
The objective of the FSR Act is to achieve a stable financial system in the interests of financial 
customers, which supports economic growth which is sustainable and balanced.44 In order to achieve 
this, financial sector laws as well as regulatory and supervisory frameworks are required.  
The responsibility for financial stability remained with the Reserve Bank, who was required to protect 
and enhance financial stability.45 The Financial Stability Oversight Committee was established with a 
focus on supporting the Reserve Bank in their financial stability function and to facilitate collaboration 
between the Reserve Bank and other sector regulators on financial stability matters.46  
The Prudential Authority (PA) was established, which would operate within the administration of the 
Reserve Bank.47 The objectives of the PA are to promote and enhance the safety and soundness of 
financial institutions and market infrastructures, protect financial customers against the risks 
associated with doing business with financial institutions and lastly to assist in maintaining financial 
stability. A Prudential Committee was established to oversee the management and administration of 
the Prudential Authority and to act on their behalf on certain matters.48  
The Financial Sector Conduct Authority was established49 with a focus on enhancing and supporting 
the efficiency and integrity of financial markets, financial customer protection and maintaining 
financial stability.50 As part of customer protection, FSCA would be required to promote the fair 
treatment of customers and to provide customer education.51 The Executive Committee was 
established to provide oversight on the management and administration of FSCA and to act on their 
behalf on certain matters.52 
The power of the PA and FSCA to make prudential and conduct standards emanated from the FSR 
Act.53 The FSR Act become effective on 1 April 2018, thus establishing the PA and FSCA. 
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3.1.2. Insurance Act54 and Prudential Standards 
The Insurance Bill was first tabled in Parliament in January 2016. The Bill went through a series of 
public consultant before finally being assented to on 17 January 2018. The objective of the Act is “…to 
promote the maintenance of a fair, safe and stable insurance market for the benefit and protection of 
policyholders...” which would be achieved through the establishment of a framework for prudential 
regulation and supervision of insurers.55 The Insurance Act repealed certain parts of the LTIA and the 
Short-term Insurance Act (STIA)56 which related to prudential matters and is applicable to both the 
non-life and life industry. The Act introduced a change in the insurance terminology with “long-term” 
and “short-term” no longer be used and a change in the classes and sub-classes of insurance business. 
All insurers and insurer groups are subject to the provisions of the Act and are required to be licenced 
under the Act.57  
Chapter 3 of the Act sets out the requirements an insurer needs to comply with in connection with 
their key persons and significant owners. The Prudential Authority has set certain governance, 
financial soundness and reporting requirements which need to be complied with by insurers an 
insurance groups.58 The Act also includes a focus on transformation and financial inclusion. 
In furtherance of the Insurance Act, Prudential Standards were published which provide the 
framework for financial soundness as well as governance and operational standards for insurers.59 The 
standards reiterate the responsibility of the Board of Directors of the insurer in ensuring that the 
requirements contained in the standards are met.  
The Insurance Act and Prudential Standards came into effect on 1 July 2018.  
3.1.3. Conduct of Financial Institutions (COFI) Bill 
The COFI Bill (the Bill) was published by National Treasury in December 2018 for public comment. The 
Bill would consolidate and strengthen the conduct laws to improve market conduct in the South 
African financial sector.60 The Bill is applicable to the conduct of all financial institutions and would 
repeal the balance of the sections in the LTIA and STIA as they related to market conduct issues. A 
financial institution would be required to be licenced under the Act should they wish to provide 
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financial products or services.61 Chapter 3 sets out proposed culture and governance standards which 
financial institutions would need to comply and prescribes fit and proper requirements which key 
persons and significant owners need to meet. Conduct standards will be prescribed by FSCA which will 
detail the various requirements of the Authority in meeting its objective.  
3.2. Amended legislation  
3.2.1. Policyholder Protection Rules 
The Policyholder Protection Rules (PPRs) are promulgated in terms of section 62 and section 55 of the 
LTIA and STIA respectively.  Prior to the December 2017 amendment of the PPRs, the original rules 
date back to 2004. Due to numerous subsequent amendments, the PPRs became disjointed and 
difficult to follow. In a positive move from the Regulator, a full set of new rules were published for 
public comment in 2016.  
The replacement of the PPRs was identified as part of phase 1 of RDR. The final version of the 2018 
PPRs was published on the 15th December 2017, which was “…necessary to give effect to a number 
of conduct of business reforms.”.62 
During 2018, an amendment to the current PPRs was published which introduced micro-insurance 
and increased funeral requirements. Through the implementation of micro-insurance, the Regulator 
sought to achieve financial inclusion. However, as the appetite of the larger insurers to play in a realm 
of small margins and potentially high-risk clients may be low, the ultimate result is unknown. 
On the 28 September 2018 amendments to the PPRs were published63 which included, among other 
minor changes, microinsurance and funeral policy product standards (funeral standards limited to the 
LTIA PPRs), payment of premiums and misrepresentation requirements.  
3.2.2. Regulations under STIA and LTIA (“Regulations”). 
Under section 72 of the LTIA and section 70 of the STIA, the Minister of Finance may make regulations 
prescribing any matter not inconsistent with the LTIA or STIA. The Regulations were originally enacted 
in November 199864 and have since undergone numerous amendments.  
In December 2017, the amended Regulations were published65 in the Government Gazette which gave 
effect to numerous changes proposed during phase 1 RDR. The Regulations came into effective from 
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1 January 2018 however allowed for various transitional periods for certain regulations. A further 
amendment was published on the 28 September 2018 with immediate effect however provided for 
certain transitional phases.66 
3.2.3. FAIS 
The FAIS Act was enacted in 2002 to regulate the provision of advice and the rendering of intermediary 
services to clients.67 Financial Service Providers are required to be licenced under the Act should they 
wish to furnish advice and/or render intermediary services.  
FSPs are required to comply with various codes of conduct and fit and proper requirements published 
in terms of the Act. In 2017 the FSB published new fit and proper requirements in Board Notice 194 
of 201768, which included competence (class of business and product specific training, experience, 
qualifications and regulatory examinations) and operational ability requirements. In addition, FSPs are 
required to undergo continuous professional development.69 
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Chapter 4: Comparative studies 
The origin of South Africa’s financial regulation is historically linked to countries such as the United 
Kingdom. During the RDR, the Regulator conducted a comparison against the laws of the countries 
mentioned below. However, placing reliance on the regulations of another jurisdiction needs to be 
carefully considered. The below mentioned countries have conducted similar reviews on their 
regulatory frameworks underlying the distribution of retail financial products.  
4.1. Australia 
At the time of RDR, Australia was conducting a review on its financial system to “…establish a direction 
for the future of Australia's financial system.”.70 The final report was released in December 2014 and 
highlighted 44 recommendations made in the area of resilience, superannuation and retirement 
incomes, innovation, consumer outcomes, regulatory services and significant matters. Similarities can 
be seen between these recommendations and the recommendations made under RDR, especially on 
the theme of customer outcomes. A recommendation on data access and use was raised, which is 
echoed by the RDR proposal on data management.  
In response, the Australian Government issued a paper on how it would address the key 
recommendations raised.71 Under resilience, APRA had announced measures to improve the resilience 
of the banking system. The crisis management powers for financial regulators would be strengthened. 
Under superannuation and retirement incomes, the objective of the superannuation system would be 
enshrined in legislation and the Productivity Commission would be tasked with developing efficiency 
measures for the superannuation system. Retirement income products would be improved by 
removing impediments. In terms of innovation, crowd-sourced equity would be facilitated, financial 
system regulations would be technology neutral and the fostering of impact investment products. A 
legislated ban on excessive surcharges on card payments would be phased in. In terms of consumer 
outcomes, financial advice standards would be enhanced, the accountability of issuers and 
distributors would be improved and remuneration structures would be reviewed to avoid any adverse 
effect on the quality of the advice received. Lastly, the Statements of Expectations would be revised 
to require reporting by financial regulators and the Financial Sector Advisory Council would be 
reconstituted, with a capability review underway of ASIC. No further detail on how these measures 
would be implemented was provided by the Government.  
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4.2. Singapore 
In Singapore the retail distribution of financial products is regulated by two regimes, namely the 
Financial Advisers Act, which covers investment type products and life insurance policies, and the 
Insurance Act which covers general insurance products. In 2012 the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) initiated a review of the regulatory framework for financial advisers, namely the Financial 
Advisory Industry Review (FAIR). On conclusion of the FAIR report, the panel submitted the 
recommendations to MAS which highlighted five themes, namely raising the competence of financial 
advisory (FA) representatives, raising the quality of FA firms, making financial advising a dedicated 
service, lowering distribution costs and promoting a culture of fair dealing.72 Post the publication of a 
consultation paper by MAS,73 a response paper was then published in September 2013 which dealt 
with the stakeholder feedback and proposed the measures to be taken to give effect to the 
recommendations adopted.74  
Many similarities between the RDR recommendations and the FAIR recommendations are noted, with 
a view on defining the activities which can be performed by certain parties and regulating 
remuneration and distribution costs.75 
In a speech delivered by the Executive Director of Monetary Authority of Singapore at the Association 
of Financial Advisers (Singapore) 18th Annual Conference on 11 July 2019, she notes that despite the 
measures implemented to address conflicted remuneration structures as identified through FAIR, 
certain industry stakeholders continued to structure remuneration frameworks in ways that hinder 
fair client treatment.76 It was emphasised that Boards and senior management would be held 
accountable in these instances. 
Unfortunately, there is always a risk that despite the implementation of legislation regulating the 
payment of remuneration, parties may create other methods of incentivising intermediaries. While 
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the FSB has capped certain remuneration, the effectiveness of this will need to be determined through 
regulatory reporting and monitoring.  
4.3. United Kingdom (UK) 
In 2006 the Financial Services Authority initiated a review on the distribution of investment policies to 
retail customers (including life policies, pensions, funds and other investment schemes)77 which 
culminated in the publication of rules on remuneration in March 201278 and final guidance on advice 
in June 2012.79 The Authority undertook to carry out a post-implementation review to determine 
whether the outcomes had been achieved.   
With regards to the rules on remuneration, the adviser would need to agree with the client for them 
to pay adviser charges to the adviser directly, alternatively the client would need to authorise the 
provider to pay them from the investment. Cancellation costs and investment amounts needed to be 
disclosed to the client in line with certain requirements. Similar rules can be seen to have been applied 
through the South African RDR.   
With regards to the guidance provided on advice, a standard was set for what was considered the 
provision of “independent advice”80. Justification would need to be given should certain products, 
which meet the needs of the customer, be precluded from the advice provided. Should the preclusion 
rise from any agreements with certain product providers, this would be considered as product 
provider influence and would not be determined as independent. The nature of the advice provided 
by the adviser (i.e. independent or restricted) needed to be communicated to the customer.  
The Financial Conduct Authority (previous Financial Services Authority) commissioned external 
consultants Europe Economics to conduct a review of the implementation of the recommendations.81 
The overall feeling of the report is positive, with ten of the eleven key findings indicating an 
improvement. A concern was raised with regards to a possible “advice” gap as firms focus on targeting 
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wealthier customers.82 However it was submitted that this group was likely be small, with other firms 
indicating their willingness to provide advice to these customers. An area of concern which warranted 
earlier attention was with regards to disclosures made by firms.83 It was submitted that further clarity 
was required as to the charges being paid and the difference between independent and restricted 
advice. While the report suggested further disclosure in providing clarity on charges and types of 
advice, which is a similar recommendation to those under the South African RDR, it is submitted that 
the disclosure is only as valuable as the financial literacy of the consumer. This sentiment is shared 
with the Financial Conduct Authority whose research suggested that improvement was required in 
the customer’s understanding of complex charging structures.84  
While the full impact of the implementation of RDR in the UK will only be seen in the future, critics 
raised the increased cost in regulation causing advisers and firms to exit the industry.85 In learning 
from the UK, South Africa regulators should consider commissioning an external consultant to review 
the progress of the implementation of RDR. While the UK review took a number of years, their 
recommendations were focused which led to a faster implementation.   
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Chapter 5: Appraisal  
5.1. Evolution of RDR recommendations  
5.1.1. 2015 
In November 2015 the FSB published a status update86 post the publication of their RDR paper. The 
implementation of the phase 1 proposals had been postponed along with the promulgation of the FSR 
Bill which was only expected to be promulgated late 2016. Feedback on the RDR paper had been 
received from 88 commentators, which was reviewed by the FSB over a six-month period.  
The phase 1 proposals were reviewed, with the next steps in their implementation being set out. 
Proposal V which restricted the ability of tied advisers to provide advice and services in respect of the 
products of other insurers, would be retained however would be amended to allow for gap filling. 
Proposal Y proposed to restrict an adviser to act as a representative of only one juristic intermediary, 
however was amended to reflect exceptions where advisers could be appointed on more than one 
FAIS licence. Proposal Z and AA which related to the restriction of functions outsourced to financial 
advisers would be retained, however the types of activities which could be outsourced required 
refinement. In addition, the policy administration fee of 2% of gross written premiums was introduced 
where the policy administration function was outsourced to advisers. Proposal FF outlined the 
responsibility of the product supplier with regards to the data of their customers and would proceed 
as recommended. Proposal OO prohibited the payment of commission by product suppliers on 
replacement life risk policies. As the advice fees framework required refinement, this proposal would 
be postponed however replacement monitoring obligations would be imposed. Proposal PP regulating 
commission and early termination values on legacy policies would proceed as recommended. Proposal 
QQ relating to retirement annuity transfers would proceed to address the conflicted remuneration. 
Both proposal RR which introduced the equivalence of reward and proposal UU which related to the 
remuneration for selling and servicing short-term policies, required further technical work before they 
could be fully implemented. Proposal VV set out requirements for the cancellation of short-term 
policies and would be implemented however subject to certain modifications. The proposed binder 
caps under proposal ZZ received extensive feedback. While the principle of binder caps would be 
implemented, further technical work was required to determine the caps. Proposal AAA 
recommended the removal of the credit life commission for administrative work and would be 
implemented as proposed. Proposal BBB suggested that an outsourcing fee for issuing of policies could 
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be paid to intermediaries who were not binder holders. This proposal however was withdrawn as 
there appeared to be no reason to outsource the function to an intermediary as this would be more 
efficiently conducted by the insurer.  
The remaining thirteen phase 1 proposals (or a portion thereof) would be implemented through 
amendments to the STIA, the LTIA and STIA Regulations, the LTIA and STIA Policyholder Protection 
Rules, FAIS General Code of Conduct, FAIS Fit and Proper requirements, the Insurance Act and 
Prudential Standards.  
In addition, proposal K (and related proposals) which positioned the adviser categorisation was 
discussed due to its impact on other proposals. Concerns were raised by stakeholders regarding the 
vagueness of the terminology used, test for independence leading to unintended consequences and 
the allowance for gap filling.87 In response alternate terminology was suggested, product supplier 
influence was considered as a determinant for independence and further investigation into how gap 
filling could be offered while still being considered a tied advisor. 
A preference by industry for a two-tier rather than a three-tier adviser categorisation was indicated. 
While the FSB was in agreement that proposal K required reconsideration, they were not satisfied with 
the suggestions provided by the stakeholders which did not adequately address the potential conflicts 
of interest. To mitigate the conflict of interest resultant from product supplier influence, the FSB 
considered additional controls which could be implemented.88 Advisers that were employed by or had 
an agency relationship with a product supplier would be considered tied which would limit the advice 
that could be provided. Advisers that conducted outsourcing functions would be subject to the terms 
of the contract and the relevant regulatory requirements. Sales targets set by product suppliers for 
advisers (excluding tied advisers) would be prohibited, as well as any restrictions imposed by product 
suppliers relating to services provided to other product suppliers. Adequate mitigation of potential 
conflicts stemming from direct or indirect ownership against strict standards would be required. Given 
the additional controls, the FSB proposed a two-tier model which would categorise an adviser as either 
a registered product supplier agent (previously tied advisers) or a registered financial adviser.89 A 
product supplier agent would be limited to providing advice on the products of its product supplier 
group, with consideration being given to allow gap filling. A registered financial adviser would be 
entitled to describe itself as independent should it meet certain criteria, whereas both a registered 
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product supplier agent and a registered financial adviser would be entitled to describe itself as a 
financial planner should they meet the financial planning standards.  
Further to the publication referred to above, the FSB published a general status update in December 
2015.90 The three phases were again outlined. Phase 1 would be affected through changes to the 
existing regulatory framework and was expected to be implemented from July 2016 onwards. Phase 
2 would be implemented through conduct standards which would be enacted under the FSR Act or 
amendments to other primary legislation. The implementation hereof would be dependent on the 
effective date of the FSR Act. Phase 3 required structural changes which would be implemented once 
the COFI Act had been enacted.  
The Regulator grouped the proposals into six themes (with some proposals overlaying more than one 
theme) and then detailed the timeframe for the implementation of the various proposals.  
Theme 1 focused on the proposed adviser categorisation and the various proposals which supported 
the concept. While the adviser categorisation model would only be implemented in later phases, the 
theme had a broader impact on the supporting proposals. The implementation phases for Theme 1 
proposals included three proposals in phase 1, eight proposals in phase 2 and twelve proposals in 
phase 3. Proposal M and L were withdrawn as they were not considered to be a “…meaningful 
determinant of independence…”.91 
Theme 2 focused on the distribution of investments and the associated remuneration. Stakeholder 
feedback highlighted the need for further clarity relating to investment platform administration. 
Proposal Z relating to the restriction on outsourcing functions and proposal MM relating to the 
restriction on the product supplier remuneration for selling and servicing investment products 
received substantial feedback from the industry. The finalisation of the proposals required further 
work, with a dependency on the implementation of other proposals. Phase 1 would see the 
implementation of two proposals, phase 2 seven proposals and phase 3 three proposals with a focus 
on extending the prohibition of product supplier remuneration to investment products with recurring 
contributions.    
Theme 3 considered the distribution of long-term insurance risk policies as well as the remuneration 
thereof. Specific proposals, namely policy replacements, credit life policies, equivalence of reward and 
outsourcing would also have an impact on this theme. Six proposals would be implemented as part of 
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phase 1, with one proposal being implemented during phase 2. In addition, proposal OO which related 
to the prohibition of commission on replacement life risk policies would be implemented over both 
phase 1 and phase 2 given the dependency on the refinement of advice fees. Controls to mitigate 
replacements driven by inappropriate incentives would form part of phase 1, with the remuneration-
based interventions forming part pf phase 2. Proposal E related to ongoing policy servicing and 
proposal NN to remuneration for ongoing services. Concerns were raised as to the vagueness of the 
proposals and clarity was required as to what was defined as an “ongoing service”. Given the further 
technical work required, implementation of the proposed up-front and on-going remuneration 
structure would be implemented in phase 3. Standards relating to the equivalence of reward would 
be implemented during phase 3 as well.  
Theme 4 focused on the distribution of short-term insurance policies, as well as the remuneration 
thereof. Specific proposals, namely outsourcing, premium collection, issuing of policy documents, 
binder arrangements and policy cancellations were also included. Six proposals would be 
implemented during phase 1. Despite the comments received on the proposed remuneration model, 
a portion of proposal UU had been included in the phase 1 implementation which would see the 
section 8(5) STIA fee being repealed. The implementation of the remuneration model would be 
extended into phase 2. The reduction of commission would require a transition period to be 
determined by technical impact testing. Proposal F proposed the limitation of the outsourcing of 
premium collection to qualifying intermediaries, which would require guidance on who would qualify 
and the relevant standards. Implementation hereof was set for phase 2. While no specific proposals 
were included in phase 3, any further refinement of the short-term remuneration model would be 
addressed.  
Theme 5 dealt with sales execution and intermediary services including non-advice based distribution 
models and low advice models. While commentators were in favour of the proposed approach, 
concerns were raised regarding the negative connotation of low advice. Standards would need to be 
developed to adequately define the proposal and to ensure the suitability of the product and the 
distribution channel used. Referrals and lead generation and the related remuneration was also 
included. Theme 5 would be implemented during phase 2 and 3 only. The enhanced FAIS competency 
framework would be implemented during phase 2, which would address aspects of proposal B (low 
advice model) and D (non-advice sales execution), with the balance to be addressed during phase 3. 
An additional five proposals would be implemented during phase 2.  
Theme 6 focused on the low-income market and the development of a special dispensation for 
distribution of financial products into this market, taking into consideration financial inclusion, which 
  
was recommended under proposal TT. In implementing this proposal, criteria would need to be set 
for remuneration models, product standards and advice. Consultation with industry would continue 
during phase 1 with phase 2 seeing the introduction of remuneration structures and advice levels 
(driven as part of the FAIS competency framework). The proposal had a direct dependency on the 
implementation of other proposals. The actual implementation of the dispensation would only take 
place in phase 3.  
In addition to the proposals mentioned above, there were seven overarching proposals which 
impacted various themes. These related to ownership standards, general disclosure standards, advice 
fees standards, remuneration standards between advisers and their firms and a general standard 
regarding financial interests. Proposal GG which related to the ownership standards would be 
implemented over all three phases, with another five proposals being implemented over phase 1 and 
2. The general standard recommended under proposal GGG would be implemented during phase 2.  
By the end of 2015, the 55 proposals had reduced by 3 proposals and many required review in light of 
industry comments.  
5.1.2. 2016 
During 2016 the FSB continued with the review of stakeholder inputs and undertook technical work 
and further consultations and published a status paper in December 2016.92 It detailed the 
implementation of the phase 1 proposals and reflected on the remaining proposals.  
In addition to the fourteen proposals initially earmarked for phase 1, the paper referenced certain 
phase 2 proposals which would be impacted during phase 1. Included in the draft FAIS Fit and Proper 
Standards which had been published for comment in October 2016, was the concept of automated 
advice and execution of sales which supported proposal B (standards for low advice distribution 
models) and proposal D (standards for sales execution).93 Furthermore, specific competence 
standards in relation to class of business training and product specific training was included, which 
facilitated various proposals relating to product supplier responsibility for advice and distribution. 
Corresponding product supplier obligations were created through the draft amendments to the PPRs. 
Insurers would only be able to contract with intermediaries who held the required FAIS licence and 
complied with the relevant FAIS competency standards.94 Proposal J which related to the clarification 
                                                          
92 Financial Services Board “Status Update: Retail Distribution Review – status as at December 2016” 2016 
https://www.fsca.co.za/Regulatory%20Frameworks/Temp/FSB%20Retail%20Distribution%20Review%20Status
%20as%20at%20December%202016.pdf (23-10-2019).  
93 (n 92) 4. 
94 (n 92) 12. 
  
of outsourced services would be affected by the proposed amendments to the LTIA and STIA 
Regulations which included a definition of outsourcing.95  
The FSB confirmed that a two-tier adviser categorisation model would adopted.96 Two categories of 
financial advisers would exist, namely a Product Supplier Agent (PSA) and a Registered Financial 
Adviser (RFA).  PSAs would operate on the licence of the product supplier that it is an agent of. Advice 
would only be provided on the product supplier’s products (home product supplier) or other product 
suppliers which formed the same group. An RFA/RFA firm (either a natural person or a legal entity 
respectively) on the other hand would be licenced in its own right. A PFA and a RFA may operate in 
the same group structure. A PSA and a RFA would be permitted to use the designation of “financial 
planner” if the adviser met certain requirements97, however only an RFA would be eligible to use the 
term “independent” if it met certain criteria.98 
While proposal R prohibited PSAs from providing advice on financial products of other product 
suppliers, certain deviations were proposed.99 A PSA would be able to provide advice on all investment 
portfolios offered on an Administrative FSP’s platform, including investment portfolios of other 
products suppliers, if the Administrative FSP forms part of the product supplier group. An interim 
deviation would allow for tied agents (representatives) of long-term insurers to offer products of other 
product suppliers if the home product supplier was not licenced for the class of business. 
Motivation had been provided justifying the use of a juristic representative entity by a PSA to provide 
advice, which would be an exclusion to the initial proposal W which prohibited juristic representative 
entities from providing financial advice.100 The exclusion was subject to further consultation and 
conditions.   
The FSB confirmed the next steps in the implementation of RDR, which included implementing phase 
1 as detailed above, as well as ongoing technical work and formal consultations on phase 2 and 3 
proposals.101 The implementation of the phase 2 proposals was dependent on the enactment of the 
Financial Sector Regulation Act, which promulgation was anticipated by the end of the first quarter 
2017. Phase 3 proposals were dependent on the enactment of the COFI Act, which promulgation was 
expected during 2018.  
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5.1.3. 2017 
In November 2017 a seminar was hosted by the FSB to provide an update to the industry on the status 
of RDR.102 Progress on RDR phase 1 was provided along with an update on the themes.  
Further consultation was required on the proposed two-tier adviser categorisation model, with input 
requested from industry.103 
A decision had been taken to recognise a low/simplified advice process in certain circumstances 
through changes to the draft FAIS General Code of Conduct and supporting regulatory guidance.104 
The proposed FAIS Fit and Proper competency requirements included a definition of the activity of 
“execution of sales” and provided competency requirements for the use of scripted sales.105 
5.1.4. 2018 
A status update on all 55 RDR proposals was published by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority 
(FSCA) (which authority had replaced the FSB) in June 2018, along with the next steps expected for 
2018.106 The FSCA would continue with the roll out of the various regulatory changes through the 
implementation of the RDR proposals in the phased approach. The industry was advised that they 
should expect the publication of a discussion paper relating to Investment Management and 
Investment Advisers, the finalised FAIS General Code of Conduct and a paper on Adviser 
Categorisation. In December 2018, a status update was published by FSCA with a specific focus on 
proposal TT (to be discussed in detail further below).107  
5.2. Did RDR achieve what it sought to  
5.2.1. Phase 1 proposals implementation   
Given the complexity of the then regulatory framework, the FSB submitted that disclosure 
requirements alone would not resolve the risks inherent in the regulatory landscape which allowed 
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hybrid advice models.108 To promote the limitation of an intermediary’s ability to act in different 
capacities, proposal V was recommended which prohibited insurer tied advisers from providing advice 
or services of another’s insurers products. This would be achieved through the deletion of sub-
paragraph (iii) of the definition of a representative contained in the Part 3 of the Regulations109 which 
allowed a representative employed by one insurer to provide intermediary services in relation to the 
products of another insurer.  
However, the draft regulation proposed included a provision allowing for such an arrangement as 
detailed in paragraph (iii) only where the representative’s insurer or another insurer in the same group 
of companies were not licenced to underwrite that class of policies.110 Furthermore, representatives 
would be able to continue rendering such services for existing policies subject to certain time limits.  
The 2017 amended LTIA Regulations111 included a new definition for representative. A representative 
included a person employed by the long-term insurer to render services as an intermediary in relation 
to policies of the insurer, of another insurer which was part of the same group of companies, of 
another insurer who is able to underwrite policies which the two aforementioned insurers are not 
registered to write and of another insurer entered into prior to the effective date where the written 
agreement of the parties pre-dated 1 January 2017.112 
Proposal V was implemented.  
Contributing to client confusion, was the ability of advisers to act as representatives to more than one 
adviser firm.113 Proposal Y sought to prohibit this practice however no indication was given with the 
proposal as to how this would be achieved.  
The FSB later proposed an amendment to the FAIS Regulations which would limit the appointment of 
representatives to one FSP in the same product class.114 This amendment however was subject to the 
Minister of Finance’s approval. 
During the 2017 RDR seminar, it was indicated that consultation on the proposal was either at very 
early stages or had not commenced.115  
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According to the RDR status update as at June 2018 the proposal was rated as “no significant public 
developments since initial proposal.”.116 Changes to the FAIS Act, alternatively the issuing of a conduct 
standard under the FSR Act was being considered to enable the Prudential Authority to prohibit 
representatives generally or specifically.   
Proposal Y has not been implemented.  
Proposal Z was recommended to prohibit the outsourcing of the functions of product suppliers or 
investment management to financial advisers, other than specifically identified and regulated 
functions.117 The intention of the proposal was to mitigate the conflict of interest in instances when 
intermediaries acted as an agent for the product supplier in performing outsourced functions and to 
provide advice or intermediary services in the best interest of the customer. This proposal included 
the outsourcing of investment management services by a Collective Investment Schemes manager to 
an authorised agent. No initial detail was provided as to how this would be implemented.  
The FSB subsequently indicated that that the amended LTIA and STIA Regulations would contain 
measures giving effect to the proposal.118 
According to the RDR status update as at June 2018 the status of the proposal was in various stages.119 
Reference is made to the developments achieved under Proposal J (detailed further below) as well as 
to the requirement of insurers to notify the Regulator should they wish to pay an intermediary for 
services other than intermediary services or binder function.  
Proposal Z has not been finalised.   
While proposal Z set out the general rule, proposal AA detailed the functions that could be outsourced 
to financial advisers, subject to certain standards.120 These functions would include binder functions, 
administration functions on behalf of retirement funds or medical schemes and issuing of policy 
documents.  
Amendments to the LTIA and STIA Regulations were proposed to introduce specific clauses relating to 
outsourcing and binder arrangements.121 Notable changes included a definition of outsourcing and 
policy data administration services in the outsourcing regulations. Binder holders who were mandated 
to enter into, vary or renew policies would not be permitted to earn additional remuneration for policy 
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data administration. A cap of 2% was suggested for policy data administration services. The proposed 
binder regulations would prohibit non-mandated intermediaries who were licenced for advice under 
FAIS from providing any other binder functions, other than the functions of entering into, varying or 
renewing policies and settling claims, in respect to long-term and short-term personal lines policies 
and any binder functions in respect of short-term commercial lines policies. Data would need to be 
provided by the binder holder to the insurer every 24 hours and the insurer would need to meet 
certain governance, oversight and record keeping obligations related to the binder activities. Certain 
exemptions could be granted to insurers on application to the Registrar.  
According to the RDR status update as at June 2018 the status of the proposal was in various stages.122 
Reference is made to the developments achieved under Proposal J (detailed further below).  
Proposal AA has not been finalised.   
Client data is imperative in understanding the needs of policyholders in ensuring that customer 
outcomes are achieved. Proposal FF sought to define the responsibilities of product suppliers with 
regards to client data, which was two-fold.123 Firstly, product suppliers are to ensure ongoing access 
to data held by intermediaries and outsourced parties to enable monitoring in the delivery of 
customer outcomes. Secondly, a certain level of data would need to be provided to advisers where 
duly authorised to allow advisers to provide appropriate financial planning or product advice. 
Standards would be proposed detailing the product supplier responsibility.  
The FSB proposed to implement the proposal in two steps, namely the PPRs would be amended to 
place an obligation on an insurer to provide information as detailed in the authorisation to the 
policyholder or the intermediary on request by the intermediary, as well as the Regulations would 
include data management and access requirements imposed on binder and outsourcing 
arrangements.124 
Rule 13 of the LTIA and STIA PPRs was introduced prescribing that an insurer must have in place an 
effective data management framework to ensure that an insurer has access to data at all times.  
LTIA and STIA Regulation 6.2A was amended to include a requirement on the insurer to ensure, prior 
to entering into a binder arrangement, that the binder holder had the operational ability to ensure 
integration between the system of the insurer and binder holder, which would allow the insurer access 
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to up-to-date, accurate and complete policyholder data in a format that the insurer could meaningfully 
utilise.  
According to the RDR status update as at June 2018, appropriate instruments were being considered 
for product supplier data related responsibilities.125 
Proposal FF was partially given effect to in Phase 1. 
In mitigating the conflict of interest in the replacement of life insurance risk policies, proposal OO 
proposed prohibiting the payment of commission by product suppliers on replaced policies however 
allowing the adviser to be remunerated by means of an advice fee payable by the client.126 The 
development of an appropriate definition of replacement transactions was required, along with advice 
and disclosure standards.  
Given the industry feedback received, the FSB deferred the implementation of a commission 
prohibition until finalisation of a remuneration model for life risk policies.127 In the meantime, an 
interim measure was suggested which would impose monitoring obligations on insurers with respect 
to replacement policies, which would include the insurer determining whether a new policy would 
qualify as a replacement policy. The replacement advice record would need to be obtained from the 
intermediary which would then require confirmation in writing by the managing executive of the 
insurer that the record was in order. Should the insurer become aware of a non-disclosure by the 
intermediary to the client, they would be obliged to notify the Regulator of the non-disclosure and the 
client of a 6 months cooling off period. This process would be implemented through the PPRs and 
would be read in connection with the proposed new definition of replacement in the FAIS General 
Code of Conduct and new LTIA Regulation requiring commission clawback in instances of non-
disclosure.  
The 2017 amended LTIA Regulations included an obligation for insurers to withhold payment or 
clawback commission where an insurer identified that due procedure had not been followed when 
the policy was replaced.128  
The new rule 19 of the LTIA PPRs refers to replacement policies and includes a definition of what is 
considered replacement. The rule details the obligations of an insurer when entering into policies 
which may be replacement policies and their duty to report issues of non-disclosure.  
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The proposed change to the FAIS General Code of Conduct (published for comment in November 
2017) included a definition for replacement which clarifies the types of transactions which constitutes 
a replacement.129 
According to the RDR status update as at June 2018 a decision on potential remuneration 
interventions on replacements was dependent on the modelling work undertaken for Proposal NN.130 
Proposal OO was partially given effect to in Phase 1, with full implementation expected in later phases. 
As legacy long-term products entered into before March 2009 still attracted the old commission 
structures which would allow for full up-front commission payments, there was a potential for 
intermediaries to increase premiums rather than consider new investment options which would be 
subject to the new commission structure.131 Proposal PP sought to amend the commission regulations 
under the LTIA to apply the new remuneration structure consistently across all policies.  
Proposed amendments to the LTIA regulations would provide for a reduction of the maximum causal 
event charges that could be applied over a period of time, any variable premium increases post 1 May 
2017 would be subject to the new remuneration structure and general fairness principles would be 
applied in calculating causal event charges in the event of multiple causal events.132 
The 2017 amended LTIA Regulations detail the charges which may be deducted determined by the 
timing of the occurrence of a casual event, cap the administration charges, amend the actuarial basis 
and values, introduce principles for calculation of casual event charges and declare that any variable 
premium increases post 1 January 2018 constitute a separate policy.133 
Proposal PP was implemented.  
Given the difference in the type of remuneration earned by the intermediary when placing 
investments in underwritten vs non-underwritten retirement annuities, under proposal QQ conduct 
standards would be proposed to mitigate the risk of conflicted retirement annuity transfers.134 Specific 
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obligations on the transferring and receiving funds in ascertaining the impact on client may be 
considered.  
The FSB proposed to address the proposal through recommended changes to the FAIS General Code 
of Conduct which would advise that retirement and living annuity transfers would be considered a 
replacement and would be subject to the relevant disclosure obligations.135 
During the 2017 RDR seminar, it was indicated that consultation on the proposal was either at very 
early stages or had not commenced.136  
According to the RDR status update as at June 2018, the proposal was under consideration.137 
Proposal QQ has not been finalised. 
Equivalence of reward was not a new concept and was contained in the Regulations of the LTIA.138 
However the FSB submitted that the principle was largely ignored by the industry.139 The importance 
of the principle was to ensure that tied advisors and independent advisers were remunerated equally. 
Proposal RR highlighted the need for standards for the embedment of the principle.  
While the full implementation of the proposal would be implemented at a later stage, the FSB 
proposed to amend the LTIA Regulations to provide clarity on the principle.140 The definition of 
representative141 would be amended to remove the reference to equivalence of reward. Instead an 
explicit provision would be included which prohibited the payment and acceptance of direct or 
indirect remuneration for rending services as an intermediary, which was not in accordance with the 
equivalence of reward principle. The Registrar would be empowered to determine whether 
remuneration complied with the principle.  
The 2017 amended LTIA Regulations included a new definition for representative which did not 
include any reference to the equivalence of reward and included a clause prohibiting the payment of 
or acceptance of remuneration which was not in accordance with the principle of equivalence of 
reward. 142 
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According to the RDR status update as at June 2018 further research would be conducted into tied 
adviser remuneration practices.143 
Proposal RR was partially given effect to in Phase 1, with full implementation expected in later phases. 
Given the continuous nature of the servicing and policy maintenance of short-term policies as well as 
the concerns raised regarding the current practice of brokers charging policyholders an additional 
fee144, the FSB reviewed the remuneration structures applicable to short-term insurance policies.145 
Proposal UU indicated that commission and service fee payments earned by intermediaries would 
remain, with the commission caps to be reviewed, however the additional fee over and above the 
commission would be prohibited. Instead advisers would be able to earn advice fees from 
policyholders should they be agreed upon. The service fee component of the remuneration earned by 
the intermediary would be subject to certain requirements to ensure that a service was being provided 
which justified the fee and that the fee was explicitly explained to the policyholder.  
The FSB subsequently proposed the replacement of section 8(5) of the STIA with Part 5C of the STIA 
Regulations.146 The new regulation would allow for the payment of a fee by the policyholder in 
instances where an actual service in addition to the intermediary services was being provided and 
which service was not already being remunerated for by another party. The fee needed to be 
reasonable and commensurate and had to be explicitly agreed to by the policyholder.  
The proposed Regulation did not proceed, however rule 12.4 of the STIA PPRs prohibits insurers from 
facilitating the deduction of fees from a policyholder for an intermediary, unless the insurer is satisfied 
that the fee has been explicitly agreed in writing and it relates to an actual service not already paid for 
by any party.  
According to the RDR status update as at June 2018, additional short-term remuneration standards 
would be informed by the findings of the intermediary segmentation analysis.147 
Proposal UU was partial implemented.  
It was suggested by the FSB that a risk existed that the replacement of short-term policies would be 
driven by intermediaries to attain more remuneration.148 Proposal VV was positioned to mitigate the 
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risk. Customer consent would be required prior to the cancellation of a short-term policy by an 
intermediary taking effect. Furthermore, insurers would remain on cover until confirmation had been 
received from the customer that it was aware of the cancellation and had consented to a new 
replacement policy, alternatively would be afforded a reasonable period (defined as 60 days) to obtain 
alternate cover.  
Amendments to the PPRs applying to both long-term and short-term policies were proposed which 
would result in an insurer remaining on cover for specific periods and until prescribed requirements 
regarding policyholder notification were met, in instances where the policy was terminated by an 
insurer for reasons other than a change in risk profile or non-payment of premiums.149 
Rule 19 ST PPRs and Rule 20 LTIA PPRs were enacted which detailed the process and requirements 
which needed to be complied with when terminating policies.   
The restated Proposal VV (which applied to both long-term and short-term insurance) was 
implemented. 
To ensure that binder fees are reasonable and commensurate to the function performance and are 
applied consistently across the industry, the FSB proposed specific binder caps which is detailed under 
proposal ZZ.150 A maximum binder fee of 2% may be earned when performing the binder function of 
entering into, varying or renewing policies. An additional binder fee of 2% may be earned should the 
binder holder determine the wording of a policy, determine the premiums or determine the value of 
the policy benefits. Should a binder holder settle claims then a binder fee of 1% to 3% would apply 
depending on the complexity of the claim.  The binder caps would not apply to underwriting managers.  
A new Part C of the LTIA Regulations and Part 5B of the STIA Regulations was proposed which would 
detail the limit on outsourcing remuneration.151 Non-mandated intermediaries who were licenced for 
advice under FAIS, would only be able to earn binder fees at 2% per binder activity. However, the 
Registrar may be approached to approve fees in excess of the caps in justified circumstances. It was 
however noted that further technical work would be required before the finalisation of the binder 
caps. 
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The 2017 amended LTIA and STIA Regulations consisted of Part 3C and Part 5B respectively which 
provided for the limitation of remuneration for binder functions.152 The binder caps allowed for a 
binder fee of 3.5% when performing the binder function of entering into, varying or renewing policies. 
An additional binder fee of 1,5% may be earned should the binder holder determine the wording of a 
policy, determine the premiums or determine the value of the policy benefits. 4% binder fee would 
be allowed for the settlement of claims.  
Proposal ZZ was implemented.  
While commission caps were in place for credit life insurance schemes, the FSB questioned the 
charging of commission for administrative work.153 A concern was raised that an intermediary could 
be remunerated twice for the same services provided under the binder functions or outsourcing 
services. Proposal AAA suggested the removal of the concept of administrative work which would 
require an amendment of the LTIA Regulations.  
An amended table contained in Part 3A of the LTIA Regulations was proposed which would remove 
the line item “with administrative work”.154 The result of this amendment is that intermediaries would 
only be able to earn a maximum commission of 7.5% for the sale of credit life policies. Should the 
intermediary provide additional services these would need to fall within the scope of binder functions 
or outsourcing services and would be remunerated accordingly.  
The 2017 amended LTIA Regulations included the amended table which no longer reflected 
administrative work. 155 
Proposal AAA was implemented.  
In instances where an intermediary issues insurance policy documents, an outsourcing fee would be 
permitted.156 This would however not be permittable should the intermediary act as a binder holder 
or where the intermediary merely captures the policy information on the insurer’s system, as this 
activity would be considered incidental to the binder functions or part of the intermediary services 
respectively. However as suggested by proposal AAA the costs involved in performing the service were 
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deemed to be insignificant and therefore an upfront fee capped at R100 per policy would be 
commensurate.  
As mentioned above, the outsourcing of the function did not appear to be justified and should remain 
the responsibility of the insurer. 
Proposal BBB was withdrawn.  
5.2.2. Phase 2 and 3 proposals implementation  
While a high-level view on some of the phase 2 and 3 proposals was positioned at the FSB seminar in 
2017157, detail around the implementation of the proposals was not provided. Importantly to take into 
consideration was at the time of the seminar the FSR Act158 had been signed by the President on 21 
August 2017. As detailed above, the impact thereof required a structural change for the Regulators, 
which would have resulted in internal disturbance until such stage as the PA and the FSCA had been 
formally established. From an operational perspective this would require a reassignment of roles and 
responsibilities. 
An update on the implementation of the forty-one phase 2 and 3 proposals was positioned by the 
FSCA, which reflected the status of each proposal as at June 2018.159 Three further proposals had been 
withdrawn, totalling five proposals. Twenty-one proposals were rated as “under deliberation or 
informal stakeholder consultation”.  
The fifteen remaining proposals had progressed into a state of formal public consultation or were 
embedded in regulatory instruments.  
Proposal C positioned the development of explicit conduct standards in the instances where advice is 
not provided directly to the end user of the financial product, but rather to employers, retirement 
funds or medical schemes.160 A proposed change to section 8(1)(a) of the FAIS General Code of 
Conduct had been published. This change placed an obligation on the FSP to obtain information on 
the reasonably identified needs and circumstances of the end user. It is submitted that this change 
does not meet the intention of the original proposal in developing explicit standards. This change has 
not yet been enacted.  
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Proposal D recommended the inclusion of a definition for sales execution which would enable the 
development of conduct standards in providing the service.161 To be included in the standard are steps 
to be taken in establishing the financial capacity of the customer and will place limits on the types of 
products to be distributed in this manner. The newly enacted FAIS Fit and Proper standards162 included 
a definition of “execution of sales” and provides that execution of sales must be performed in line 
with an approved script and under direct oversight of a key individual. While the concept has been 
defined in line with the proposal, it is noted that representatives that provide execution of sales are 
subject to more lenient minimum qualifications, are not required to complete regulatory examinations 
and do not have to undergo class of business training. While the FSCA has advised that other conduct 
standards for sales execution are being considered163 a conduct gap remains in that the explicit 
requirement to establish the customer’s financial capability has not yet been finalised.  
It was suggested under Proposal F to limit the service of collecting premiums to qualifying 
intermediaries. Amendments to Part 8 of the LTIA and Part 4 of the STIA regulations164 require 
intermediaries who collect premiums to be authorised in writing by the relevant insurer, which 
authorisation needs to include certain specifications, and to comply with various other requirements.  
Various recommendations were made under Proposal J in order to clearly identify and regulate the 
services that may be outsourced by product suppliers. Significant progress under this proposal has 
been facilitated by the amendments to the LTIA and STIA Regulations, the STIA and LTIA PPRs, FAIS Fit 
and Proper requirements and in the Prudential Standards. Further work is being done through the 
intermediary activity segmentation analysis.  
The FSCA advised that an updated Adviser Categorisation discussion paper would be published during 
2018 which would impact Proposal K, P, R, W, CC and DD.165 This discussion paper has not yet been 
published. 
While the proposed FAIS General Code of Conduct166 includes requirements which will determine the 
use of the descriptor “independent”, the intention of Proposal N was broader than that criteria and 
therefore is not adequately addressed should the amended Code of Conduct be enacted as suggested.  
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The enactment of the proposed FAIS General Code of Conduct would facilitate the partial achievement 
of proposal HH (disclosure standards) and JJ (advice fee standards).  
A discussion paper on proposal TT had been published by the FSCA for public comment.167 The FSCA 
advised that the microinsurance and funeral product standards had been introduced in response to 
the proposal highlighting the importance of product standards in defining which products would 
qualify for a dispensation. The recent amendments to the LTIA168 and STIA169 Regulations provided 
that commission payable on microinsurance and funeral was uncapped. The FAIS Fit and Proper 
requirements applicable to Tier 2 products, under which microinsurance policies will fall would attract 
more lenient competency requirements. However further work was required on remuneration and 
FAIS Fit and Proper dispensation for savings and investment products.  
5.3. Impact of industry consultation  
Throughout the entire process, industry engagement was encouraged by the FSB and was forthcoming 
by various commentators, industry participants and others. Various workshops were held with 
industry reference groups on various areas impacted by the proposals. The influence of the industry 
is seen in the reworking of the proposals and the suggested method of achieving the outcomes.   
5.3. Conclusion  
Out of the original fourteen phase 1 recommendations, five proposals have been fully implemented, 
with six proposals partially implemented, one proposal not yet implemented and one proposal being 
withdrawn. Out of the remaining forty-one proposals under phase 2 and 3, one proposal has been 
fully implemented, with three proposals partially implemented, thirty-two proposals not yet 
implemented, and five proposals being withdrawn. In total of the fifty-five original proposals, only six 
proposals have been implemented, nine proposals partially implemented, thirty-four proposals not 
yet implemented, and six proposals being withdrawn. Closing in on five years post the initial release 
of the RDR report, one has to wonder whether the Regulators have lost steam. It is without question 
that a lot of work has gone into RDR and the resultant legislation, however with the change in structure 
and therefore leadership at the Regulators it would appear that others are left to continue with the 
rather ambitious targets set by the previous management. The tsunami of new and amended 
legislation that has poured on the insurance industry over the past few years appears to be broader 
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than the recommendations made in RDR. Perhaps the Regulators signed up for more than they could 
manage.  
The office of the Ombudsman for Short-Term insurance (OSTI) publish an annual report reflecting 
various industry statistics.170 Of relevance is the insurer statistics presented depicting the number of 
complaints received by OSTI in comparison to the number of claims received by the various insurers. 
While the statistics are impacted by various factors, such as the number of insurers, whether it was a 
bad claims year influenced by catastrophic events, etc. it evidences certain trends.  
According to the 2018 report171 8 857 complaints were received by the OSTI, which is a ratio of 2,52 
per thousand claims received by the insurer. In comparison in 2017172 8 293 complaints were received, 
in 2016173 9 423 complaints were received, in 2015174 9119 complaints were received and in 2014175 
9 581 complaints were received. The respective ratio per thousand claims were as follows 2017 2,4 
per thousand, 2016 2,94 per thousand, 3 per thousand 2015 and 2014 3 per thousand. 
While it appears that there has been some improvement since 2014, this could either be a positive 
trend or a negative trend. In other words, the number of complaints may have decreased as 
policyholders are less aware of the avenues to their disposal to have their grievance resolved 
influenced by low financial literacy, miscommunication or poor client services. On the other hand, the 
decrease in the number of complaints and the claims to complaints ratio may reflect just that, that 
policyholders were happy with the insurers decision and that insurers dealt with any complaints 
internally to the policyholder’s satisfaction.  
An interesting statistic is the number of complaints finalised with some benefit to the insured. In these 
cases the OSTI has disagreed with the insurer in some respect. The benefit may be the payment of the 
claim or a goodwill payment resulting from poor claims experience. In 2018, 1 589 complaints out of 
8 558 finalised complaints were finalised to the benefit of the client. This is a 19% overturn rate.176 
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175Ombudsman for Short-term Insurance “Annual Report 2014” 2014  
https://www.osti.co.za/media/1114/annual-report-2014-low.pdf (23-10-2019). 
176 Overturn rate is defined as “where the insured received some benefit as a result of OSTI’s intervention”.  
  
The overturn rates in 2017177, 2016178, 2015179 and 2014180 were 20,14%, 27,27%, 26,73% and 30,78% 
respectively. While it appears that the OSTI and insurers are more aligned, less of the policyholder 
complaints are being resolved in their favour.  
The new wave of regulations can be seen to have achieved the establishment of market-conduct 
regulations. However, as most insurers come to the end of the transitional implementation phase, the 
true effectiveness of the regulation will need to be determined in the years to come.  
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179 (n 174) 14.  
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